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Religion, in highland South Sulawesi in the second decade of the twentieth 
century was not treated with the neutrality claimed by the Dutch for their 
rule in the Indies. A long and costly war had just been concluded with the 
Acehnese, and Islamic organizations on Java were showing signs of vitality 
that troubled the colonial authorities. Dutch officials throughout those
islands which had substantial Muslim populations and still unconverted groups 
of highlanders were, then, concerned over the potential of a politically militant 
Islam. This caused the government to focus more attention on contiguous highland 
populations in provincial policy planning than their numbers warranted. So 
it was that the Torajan world was not left to make its slow accommodation 
with the Islamic lowlands of South Sulawesi.
Dutch officials operated on the assumption that the mere proximity of 
Bugis Muslims (who had already penetrated and converted inhabitants of the 
foothills of Enrekang and Duri to the south) would lead to large-scale Torajan 
conversion to Islam. Islam was perceived as an advancing tide that could
only be stopped by building a bulwark in the highlands; isolation was the 
only way to preserve the heathens from Islamic conversion and to save them 
for later conversion to Christianity. Breedveldt Boer, assistant resident 
of Luwu, summed up the government position generally put forward in this period:
Greater security of persons and goods since our arrival [in 1905] 
had resulted in more contact—chiefly through trade—between coastal 
peoples and heathen ethnic groups. Thus, a fraternization is
underway between the former oppressors and the oppressed, the
Muslims and the heathen, a fraternization and mingling which will 
increase still further as the economic development of the land 
and people increases. Although there is much to rejoice in about 
development and it cannot be enough supported by the government, 
there lies in this fraternization the future evil that the heathen, 
in the first place in the vicinity of Rantepao and Makale, will 
more easily than previously be converted to Islam. Torajans who 
have temporarily moved to Palopo to seek work with traders or 
Europeans, do not eat pork because they feel self-conscious among
Muslims; indeed, the number that undergo circumcision for this
reason is also very great.
All this together means, I believe, that it is high time to 
begin with evangelization, not only in Rantepao and Makale such as 
the present plans call for, but in the whole heathen region. . . . 1
1. Breedveldt Boer, "Memorie van overgave, van de aftreden Assistent-Resident 
van Loewoe," pp. 65-66 (Palopo, 1913, in my possession).
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Several interesting points emerge from this commentary. One is the way in 
which the government was so willing to dichotomize the groups involved into 
"coastal" and "heathen," not ordinarily considered a parallel construction. 
Coastal, as the Dutch so rightly understood in the Indonesian context, did 
indeed mean Muslim, and usually this variety of religious outlook was associated 
with a fairly thorough-going Islam. "Heathen," on the other hand, was correctly 
used as a synonym for "highlander" at this time, since these were the only 
pockets of population in the archipelago that remained isolated from at least 
a nominal conversion to Islam.
Another point is the tendency to perceive the Torajans and Bugis as enemies, 
as oppressed vs. oppressors. Certainly ther* was basis for such a generalization, 
but it missed the essential features of the interaction between leaders of the 
Torajan and Bugis communities, that in part explained the successful exploitation 
of Torajans by the Bugis. This undifferentiated view of both the Bugis and 
Torajan was a convenient one for the Dutch to hold, given their concern over 
the spread of Islam, and it came to assume a place in the pantheon of unexamined 
assumptions that dictated Dutch policy. The Bugis were continually portrayed 
as the strong, the Torajans as the weak. In its stripped-down version presented 
by a mission spokesman, the argument ran like this:
The Bugis are a mighty people. One finds among them keen seafarers 
and their trade activity had already stretched throughout the 
Indies by the time of the Company.
As a seafaring folk , they have obtained a certain worldly 
wisdom. Also by means of their religion they have made contact 
with Arabic elements, with whom many have gone to live.
The Bugis are thus more advanced than the Torajans. Where 
the Bugis appear, they supersede the Torajans. Where they marry 
Torajans, one finds little of the Toraja-type in their offspring 
but rather a thoroughly Bugis type. 2 3
Extending this reasoning, the same spokesman argued that the Bugis had not 
wanted to convert Torajans prior to the coming of the Dutch because they were 
easier to exploit that way. Now however, since the Dutch provided political 
leadership that prevented these abuses from continuing, the Bugis were out 
to dominate the Torajans spiritually.
Neither government nor mission representatives gave the Torajans much 
credit for an autonomous response. Although there had been little actual 
conversion of Torajans to Islam in the highlands, the Dutch drew examples 
from those Torajans living in Muslim regions who had appeared willing to acquire 
some of the outward forms of Islam. We have seen Boer's account of this phenomenon 
in Palopo. Another major source of examples was the large population of former 
slaves returning from Bone and Sidenreng who had been released as a result 
of the conversion of slavery to debt bondage by Governor Kroesen. Of the 
estimated 12,000 Torajans who had been seized for slavery and transported 
to the lowlands, about one-third had gone back before the 1911 deadline by 
which Torajans could legally leave the Bugis lands. Some would not return 
because they had been well absorbed into lowland life and frequently had converted 
to Islam. * Those converts to Islam who did return to the highlands became
2. A. A. van de Loosdrecht, AUe den Volcke [hereafter ADV], June 1915, p. 40. 
Alle den Volcke was a mission monthly journal appearing in the Netherlands.
3. Boer, "Memorie van overgave," p. 111.
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a sudden new focus of concern for the Dutch administration, as shown in this 
1910 report:
[Conversion (to Islam) is also promoted by the return of many 
former Torajan slaves, who from much time in slavery in Sidenreng 
and Bone embraced Islam. The disappearance of [Islamic influence 
from the highlands] is out of the question, as indicated by a 
report from the controleur of Mandar that Torajans here and there 
are beginning to regard pigs as unclean animals.4 5
The author of this report did not carefully distinguish his cases, lumping 
the returning Torajan slaves together with Torajans in Mandar (the west coast 
of Central Sulawesi) who were beginning to observe a pork taboo. It would 
indeed have been fascinating to observe the Torajan slaves as they once again 
took up residence in the highlands if they were now regarding pigs as unclean. 
The pressure exerted on them to resume eating pork would have been very heavy, 
given the ceremonial importance of the meat. Because there is almost no further 
mention of this phenomenon, however, one is inclined to conclude that the 
returning slaves did not form a discrete community of Torajan Muslims, though 
as individuals they may have remained Muslim. But in Mandar Torajans inhabiting 
the lower hills near the shore had begun to respond to influences from the 
coast and convert to Islam. Where physical geography did not divide Bugis 
and Torajans discretely, coastal culture increasingly penetrated the highlands 
resulting in a religious dichotomization of people locally referred to as 
"Toraja Salang" (Islamic Torajans) and "Toraja Kapiri" (literally, "Kafir" 
or "pagan" Torajans, obviously from a Muslim perspective). *
The Coming Of the Mission
Set against their concern that Islam was penetrating the highlands of 
South Sulawesi, Netherlands Indies authorities in Makassar sought to encourage 
mission societies to take an interest in the region. Provincial officials 
permitted Luwu's assistant resident, Breedveldt Boer, to explore possibilities 
with mission groups, inviting them to observe the situation in Makale-Rantepao 
and develop plans for its conversion. Largely for financial reasons the missions 
proved unable to respond to the government's invitation, though Colonel Covaars 
of the Salvation Army did visit the highlands in January 1912. Boer was then 
forced to fall back on engaging an assistant minister from the Protestant 
Church of the Indies (hereafter "Indies Church") to make a brief visit to 
Makale- Rantepao in March of that year.
The history of the Indies Church made it a seemingly unlikely candidate 
for an assignment whereby it would pioneer Christian proselytizing in highland 
South Sulawesi. An early creation of the VOC, it had maintained its identity 
as a colonial state church long after the official separation of church and 
state in the Netherlands. The nineteenth century rise of pietism and religious 
revivalism that created mission societies in the Netherlands left the Indies 
Church largely unaffected, though it was put increasingly on the defensive 
as these societies actively sought permission to open mission fields in the 
Indies. Almost solely because the state revenues it received enabled it to
4. Adatrechtbundel IX, Series P, Zuid Celebes, No. 3 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1914), pp. 239-40.
5. Boer, "Memorie van overgave," pp. 22$ 54; 66-67.
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hire an evangelist, the Indies Church now found itself expected to advance 
the faith aggressively into the highland regions of Sulawesi. It found itself 
in this position because the state perceived its own interests served by the 
Church's presence there. Thus while the Indies Church changed its mission 
to meet new circumstances in Holland and the Indies, its historical role as 
quiet servant of the government's interests remained constant.
Assistant minister Kelling, who made the first visit for the Indies Church 
to Makale-Rantepao, was subsequently placed in Makale in a position jointly 
financed by the Church and the Governor General, who intended to subsidize 
evangelistic work in Central and South Sulawesi until the private missions 
were financially able to take it over.* Not cut from the aristocratic mold 
of the full-fledged ministers of the Indies Church, assistant minister Kelling 
was willing to become a circuit-evangelist based for short periods in outlying 
areas to supervise the building of schools and placing of teachers, all seen 
as preliminary steps to eventually baptizing the students and (it was hoped) 
their families. In contrast to the record of most missionaries of the Indies 
Church, the number of his conversions had been phenomenal in Luwuk (northeastern 
arm of Sulawesi, not to be confused with Luwu) and in the Binuang district 
of Mamasa, west of the Sa'dan highlands. In two short visits to the Binuang 
district he had baptized 5,000 persons.
In Makale-Rantepao, while using less spectacular methods of conversion than 
elsewhere, Kelling still minimized pre-baptismal instruction before administering 
the sacrament. He seems to have focused his proselytizing on the sons of chiefs 
who were attending the government school in Makale, a Second Class Native 
School popularly called the "landschap" or regional school.6 7 8 A group of twenty 
students were suddenly baptized without prior permission from their parents or 
knowledge of the government, touching off a row that left many influential 
Torajans embittered toward Christianity. The controleur reported that "most 
of the elders resigned themselves to what had happened but declared firmly 
that no more of their children would be permitted to convert to Christianity." 
Significantly in light of later events, the controleur concluded that the 
incident had stemmed from the failure of coordination between the government 
and the missionary: "Later more cooperation developed between the government 
and mission, with the result that in several places private village schools 
were built."*
Many competing interests were brought into sharp relief between 1911 and 
1913. Because of its concern that Islam was an advancing tide poised to sweep 
over the highlands, the provincial government wanted to induce Christian conver­
sion there with all due speed. Meanwhile, despite the activities of assistant 
minister Kelling, the Indies Church was still largely at odds with the aggressive
6. This and the following paragraph are based on van de Loosdrecht, ADV, 
November 1915, pp. 86-87.
7. In principle, each onderafdeeling (subdivision) town in South Sulawesi 
had at least one government primary school. A five year, Malay-medium primary 
school was opened in both Makale and Rantepao towns in 1909. Dutch authorities 
sought to restrict attendance to the children of headmen, whose early suspicions 
of Dutch intentions led some of them secretly to substitute their clients' 
children.
8. E. A. J. Nobele, "Memorie van overgave betreffende de onderafdeeling Makale," 
Tijdschrift voor Indisch Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 66 (1926): 9.
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evangelical spirit emanating ever more strongly from mission societies in 
Holland, and it tried to slow the entry of the private Dutch mission societies 
into the places where it was beginning to proselytize. The Datu of Luwu, 
who in the eyes of evangelists and government officials represented militant 
Islam, was equally opposed to the missions’ entry and did his best to see 
that no funds from the budget of Afdeeling Luwu went to subsidize any Christian 
proselytizing. Nonetheless, by 1913 both the Indies Church and the Datu had 
lost out; and it was through a resident missionary sent by the Calvinist Mission 
Alliance (GZB), subsidized from the Luwu budget, that the government began 
to lay the foundation for establishing Christianity in the highlands.
The GZB missionary A. A. van de Loosdrecht came to Makale-Rantepao by way 
of the Mission Institute located near Leiden. Dominated by the methods of 
the famed pair of Dutch missionaries, N. Adriani and A. C. Kruyt, the Institute’ s 
approach combined a wide variety of skills in ethnography, carpentry, medicine, 
teaching, and, of course, preaching. Teachers at the Institute contended that 
a good cultural understanding of the people to whom one ministered was necessary 
before one could hope to manipulate the religious and social system in ways 
that would lead to Christianization. By finding common elements, pouring 
new wine into old skins as it were, the religious transformation would come 
about more profoundly. Tinkering with symbolic systems rather than overhauling 
them posed less likelihood of provoking an adverse reaction and promised a 
more genuinely held Christianity. »
On his maiden journey inland from Palopo to Rantepao, the GZB missionary, 
van de Loosdrecht, spent a night at the government rest house midway to his 
destination. Not speaking much of the Torajan language (Tae’) and still rudi­
mentary in his Malay, he attempted to instruct one of the porters carrying his 
belongings to wake him in the morning by knocking on the resthouse door. The 
difficulties inherent in transmitting this lesson in alien forms of communication 
soon became all too apparent when the porter attempted to beat down the door 
in the manner he believed he was emulating. We are left to assume that the 
missionary rose on his own the following morning.9 10 1
After experiencing in miniature, then, some of the difficulties that would 
confront him in the Sa'dan highlands van de Loosdrecht arrived in Rantepao. 
Having come to convert its people, he would first have to communicate notions 
foreign to the Torajan experience. To succeed in his own mission he would 
have to convince Torajans of the significance of the innovations he offered. 
And, as with the door, Torajans might receive a message very different from 
the one he intended to convey.
Before settling in Rantepao, van de Loosdrecht and his wife (who had hitherto 
remained in the Luwu capital of Palopo) spent three months in Posso with the 
Dutch missionary Kruyt, observing his twenty-year-old mission.111 (Though 
located a considerable distance from Makale-Rantepao in Central Celebes, the 
Posso highlanders did have cultural traits in common with Sa'dan highlanders.)
9. A. M. Brouwer, "The Preparation of Missionaries in Holland," International 
Review of Missions [hereafter IRM] 1 (1912): 229-39; and G. A. Gollock, "The 
Present Outlook of the Preparation of Missionaries," IRM 13 (1924): 385.
10. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, February 1914, p. 16.
11. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, May 1914, pp. 37-39.
90
Four Torajan youths—one a nephew of Pong Maramba, 11 the powerful headman 
of Rantepao—accompanied the van de Loosdrechts to this foreign highland society 
as Tae' (Sa'dan Toraja) language tutors to prepare them for their return to 
Rantepao. During this time the Tae* language appears to have come easily 
to the determined missionary and his wife, as did impressions about the power 
a missionary had to transform East Indies societies. Kruyt had in many ways 
combined the functions of government and mission in the ten years prior to 
the Dutch expansion of their authority to the region in 1905. With such a 
foothold, the mission tended to mold the character of the later arriving Dutch 
administration. Without having to identify with the secular state, Kruyt's 
mission had received ample cooperation from it. As Ida van de Loosdrecht 
later wrote to Mrs. Kruyt, "We often say to one another, 'how wonderful for 
Posso that the mission preceded the Government.'"1*
Back in Rantepao the ambitious missionary set out to recreate the city on 
a hill that he had witnessed in Posso under the seasoned master. With a sense 
of urgency, he visited the major districts of Rantepao, met their headmen, and, 
in a meeting also attended by the controleur, encouraged them to build schools
in their kampung. 12 34 156 "Of all the means that a mission has at its disposal
to gain entry to the people," he wrote soon afterwards, "the school is surely 
one of the most prominent." And while his approach was aimed at the future 
adults of the society, he did not concede those already grown up: "The way 
to the heart of a father and mother in mission work goes through the child. 
Children attach themselves quickly to their teachers, who have a knack of 
getting on with them even more than their parents d o ."1*
By pushing education, the mission hoped it had found a means by which
to enter traditional societies without creating the type of resistance that
would be engendered by a direct attack on traditional religious values. The 
problem remained to convince district headmen and their village clients that 
they themselves would derive some benefit from the schools. Van de Loosdrecht 
found the traditional elite initially cautious but generally willing to consider 
allowing schools to enter their torvdok (district).14 In retrospect, it appears 
that they were probably less enthusiastic than the missionary reported to 
his home board.17 The headmen were still in the process of evaluating the 
behavior of the "Kompania," the name they still applied to the Dutch government 
over a century after the demise of the Dutch East Indies Company. It appeared 
to them that the school was one of the forms of tribute demanded by the new 
patron state. For some years many continued to believe that it was a disguised 
means of drafting their sons into the colonial army and taking them away from
12. Sampe Pandin, interview, January 22, 1978, Ujung Pandang.
13. Letter from Ida van de Loosdrecht to Mevrouw Kruyt, May 25, 1914, Rantepao. 
(Archive, Hervormde Kerk, Oegstgeest; hereafter AHK.)
14. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, March 1914, p. 23.
15. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, October 1914, pp. 85-86.
16. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, March 1914, p. 23.
17. D. Crommelin, "Rapport over het bezoek aan het zendingsterrein van den 
Gereformeerden Zendingsbond in Rantepao en Makale, Juni 1918," pp. 2-3 (AHK); 
E. A. J. Nobele (untitled secret government report on the death of A. A. van 
de Loosdrecht, by Assistant Resident of Luwu), Palopo, August 20, 1917 (AHK).
91
the highlands. Thus while on the surface they acquiesced to this peculiar 
new form of tribute, they also tried to circumvent it in various ways.
Van de Loosdrecht's first year in Rantepao can be seen as a cautious effort 
to undo what Kelling of the Indies Church had done during his short tenure 
in the Sa'dan highlands, as well as to counterbalance the "bad examples" set 
by both the Dutch and Malay-speaking Christians stationed in Makale-Rantepao 
with the NEI administration.18 1920 Pragmatically he accepted the hasty baptismal 
techniques of evangelist Kelling for their value in slowing the advance of 
Islam, while he maintained that their use had produced a Christianity that 
was superficial at best. He ridiculed the cautious forays made to the town 
of Makale by the elitist minister of the Indies Church stationed in Makassar, 
Kyftenbelt. Kyftenbelt preferred to spend an hour a week with the five Christians 
in Makale town and the rest of the week recovering, van de Loosdrecht complained; 
never would he dream of setting foot in the villages. What was worse, Kyftenbelt’ s 
wife insisted on parading about under a white umbrella like some royal personage, 
followed by an entourage of servants bearing her daily necessities.18
Van de Loosdrecht himself retained many of the stereotypes of "the native" 
common to the Dutch colonials of his time and tended to patronize Torajans as 
children who needed tutoring. Yet he understood the inherent limitations of 
the elitism of Kyftenbelt and others like him in the Netherlands Indies Church 
who were content to wait for potential converts—shorn of their traditional 
explanatory systems through education, employment, or migration—to surface 
in urban centers. By contrast, the strategy of the hill country evangelist 
of the twentieth century was to bring about that transformation in place.
Convinced of the importance of the elite to any successful mission venture 
in Makale-Rantepao, van de Loosdrecht sought to develop personal relationships 
with key district and village headmen. Within a short time he identified 
Pong Maramba of Rantepao, Ne* Mattandung of Balusu, and Tandibua of Pangala 
as central figures among the onderafdeeling (subdivision) Rantepao elite. 
Frequently he visited their kampung, especially those of Maramba and Mattandung 
whose houses were not far away from his own. Maramba did not go out of his 
way to reciprocate the missionary's interest in him, but, after a few fruitless 
attempts, van de Loosdrecht finally managed to find the headman at home, having 
just returned from a death feast. Their exchange that evening was, by the 
missionary's account, a warm one in which he avoided outright proselytizing. 
The women in Pong Maramba's household paid a return visit to Mrs. vande Loosdrecht 
some days later, displaying great curiosity over the bed, sewing machine, 
and church organ as they led the somewhat astonished woman about her own house. 
An amiable enough relationship had begun to develop, it would seem.
With Ne' Mattandung of Balusu, relations were similarly cordial at first. 
Van de Loosdrecht was sensitive to the fact that Balusu district was located 
on the western border of Luwu and he was alert to possible signs of Islamization
18. "Yes, the Christians here in general provide a poor example. They look 
upon the Torajans as lowly but not too low to enter into the most intimate 
of relationships with them." Van de Loosdrecht's letter to Kruyt, December 
30, 1914, Rantepao (AHK).
19. Ibid.
20. Ida van de Loosdrecht, ADV, November 1914, pp. 95-96. "If Pong Maramba 
were to become Christian, the strength of heathendom would be forever broken," 
wrote the missionary's wife.
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emanating from this old Islamic kingdom.11 Historically the Balusu "Puang"21 2 
had married into the Luwu court families, quite like their Islamicized neighbors 
in the adjacent Luwu Highlands; Ne' Mattandung's daughter herself was married 
to a close relative of the Datu. Perhaps attuned to the missionary's fear 
that this pattern of intermarriage signalled the beginning of the Islamization 
of Balusu, Ne' Mattandung apparently assured him that, despite the birth of 
a child, the father’ s two-year absence meant that the marriage was as good 
as dissolved. The missionary counted on Mattandung to provide a prime point 
of contact with Torajan society, just as invading Dutch troops had relied 
on him eight years before, when they extended their administrative control 
into the highlands. Nonetheless van de Loosdrecht harbored the suspicion 
that Mattandung retained an "inclination toward Islam."2*
While attempting to build cultural bridges directly to the headmen, the 
van de Loosdrechts sought allies in their children as w ell.24 They invited 
several youths from influential families to board with them, providing Biblical 
instruction and a Dutch Calvinist moral framework. Van de Loosdrecht depended 
on his boys to teach him the language and, more importantly, to form the core 
of the first indigenous group of guru (teachers), and guru injil (evangelists). 
Their high social status insured that these pioneer figures would draw attention.
Girls were trained as prospective wives for the Malay-speaking and Torajan 
guru.25 26 Ida van de Loosdrecht taught them a Victorian morality quite alien 
to Torajan custom, schooled them in the basics of nutrition, hygiene, and 
housekeeping, and instructed them on how to use the sewing machine. These 
women would provide the moral and spiritual fiber for the children at home 
that would set the Christian household apart from the heathen. Without a 
pool of suitable marriage partners from which to draw, the teachers would 
be more likely to become embroiled in scandal with village women, and decrease 
the effectiveness of their religious message in a society where "[t]he children 
understand the whole village chronicle, know who has a quarrel with whom, 
who speaks scandalously of others and who has deceived another, who is esteemed 
and who is disdained." 24
Initially the missionary adopted a conciliatory approach toward the indigenous 
religion and ritual that underpinned the elite with whom he was so concerned. 
He took the high road of emphasizing schooling while avoiding talk about religion 
in his initial meetings with people. "As soon as they hear that the morals 
and customs of their ancestors must be changed, their favorable disposition 
immediately disappears and they refuse to do anything," he w rote.27 If he 
took the back door and stimulated widespread acceptance of schools, religious
21. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, October 1914, pp. 88-89.
22. "Puang" was the highest term of nobility in the southern portion of the 
Sa'dan highlands (Makale, Mengkendek, Sangalla) as well as the eastern tondok 
of Sa'dan and Balusu.
23. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, July 1915, p. 44.
24. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, March 1914, pp. 23-24; van de Loosdrecht, letter 
to Kruyt, February 22, 1916, Rantepao (AHK).
25. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, May 1916, p. 40.
26. J. Belksma, ADV, June 1918, p. 42.
27. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, September 1914, p. 84.
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education would naturally follow. This, he assured any skeptics in the home 
church in Holland, was because the heathen mind did not easily distinguish 
between the sacred and the profane; in due course it would seem natural that 
religion was being taught in school.** Surprisingly, he did not anticipate 
that Torajan opposition to the schools might arise out of that same unitary 
world view.
Van de Loosdrecht's directness and the nagging image he retained of the 
flourishing mission in Posso prevented him from circumventing religious issues 
for long, though he initially chose his themes with discretion. He told the 
creation story frequently and selected Abraham, Noah, and other Old Testament 
patriarchs to appeal to the Torajan ancestral reverence. ** The Biblical myth 
of the flood, which he found to be very popular, strongly resembled a Torajan 
myth. His use of the Prodigal Son parable further exemplified his early efforts 
at finding commonalities between Torajan religion and Christianity.*0 Van 
de Loosdrecht held a view of primitive religions having declined from an earlier 
purity to a corrupted state. This view implied that Torajans had originally 
believed in the same high god as the God of the Christians, but that through 
the centuries the belief had become corrupted by spirit worship. Therefore 
Torajans need only strip away these corruptions to reveal the high god; they 
need only return to belief in "Puang Matoa." The use of the indigenous name 
of a prominent Torajan deity for the Christian "God" as much as the missionary's 
emphasis on a "return"--i.e., the Prodigal Son—set a context for religious 
discussion that accepted much that was authentically Torajan. This fitted 
nicely with a strategy of conversion focused on attracting the elite.
If working through the traditional elite composed one leg of the initial 
mission strategy, cooperation with the Dutch administration constituted the 
other. Van de Loosdrecht was an acutely political man, who knew the meaning 
of lobbying for his causes and appeared able to locate the points in the 
various tiers of the East Indies administrative hierarchy where he could exert 
pressure. His interest in gaining active support from the government stemmed 
from the view he took of religious, or more broadly, cultural change: that 
the efforts by the mission to loosen Torajans from their cultural moorings 
had scant impact compared to changes induced by the East Indies administration.*1 
The outlawing of headhunting and trial by ordeal, abolition of the slave trade, 
and forced resettlement ("kampung-forming"), to take several examples, had 
given the traditional order a shock from which it would never recover. In 
providing a buffer between Torajans and their "former oppressors" the Bugis, 
the Dutch administration had given the formation of Torajan ethnic consciousness 
a "great shove."** But through its various modifications of tradition (in 
the name of preserving tradition), the government had succeeded in loosening 
people from their animism while providing them nothing directly to replace 
it. In this anomic state, "[the Torajan] himself waits for something to 
replace" his earlier beliefs, the missionary anticipated.** The mission would 
provide that something in the wake of government-induced social change. 289301
28. Ibid., p. 86.
29. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, April 1915, p. 21.
30. Letter from van de Loosdrecht, February 22, 1916, Rantepao (AHK).
31. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, August 1915, p. 60.
32. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, October 1914, p. 86.
33. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, June 1915, p. 41.
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During the first year of GZB activity in Makale-Rantepao, relations with 
the East Indies government officials were not notably cordial. The government’ s 
deep anxiety that Islamic adherents would penetrate the highlands and convert 
the hill peoples was counterbalanced for a time by their misgivings about 
the blunders committed by the overly eager evangelist Kelling. His mass baptism 
of school-aged children without regard to the wishes of their parents raised 
concerns that perhaps one potential threat to "peace and security" would be 
replaced by another. The quality of the teaching personnel loosed upon the 
highlands was brought into question by the dismissal of a teacher for his 
swindling activities in the Makale village to which he had been assigned. 
Though the Indies Church mission was soon displaced from Makale-Rantepao by 
the arrival of van de Loosdrecht in 1913, a cloud of zealotry still hung over 
the highlands.
It is most ironic that zealotry should ever have been associated with 
the Indies Church, given its tepid record of proselytizing in other parts 
of the Netherlands East Indies. It was a zeal, in the Sa’dan highlands, born 
of the hasty efforts of the provincial government to use whatever Protestant 
vehicle was at hand to begin erecting a Christian buffer in South Sulawesi.
During the six years following the introduction of government schools in 
1908, the authorities had regularly resorted to using troops to round up truant 
children of the elite and bring them to school in the towns. Van de Loosdrecht 
believed that such an approach could be an effective lever to help him build
attendance at his village schools. He pressed for permission for elite children
attending the government school to be given the option of attending the mission 
village schools. The controleur of Rantepao finally conceded this point, 
and, with that, van de Loosdrecht was able to employ the implied force of 
military truant officers to the mission’s advantage. He reported absentees 
to the controleur, who had the parents of truant children arrested in their 
villages and taken to the Rantepao ja il.*4 With such heavy-handed practices, 
an absentee rate of 5 to 10 percent was considered high.
While attempting to maximize both direct and indirect benefits of government 
policy in Rantepao and Makale, the missionary and his supporters sought to 
have officers more sympathetic to the mission installed in the highlands.
Lobbying the bureaucracy appears to have paid off by the end of 1915, just
over a year after the missionary had arrived. The newly appointed controleur 
of Rantepao, M. R. Brouwer, was a man who shared the religious outlook of 
the GZB mission and who, van de Loosdrecht predicted, "will not withhold his 
unqualified support from us."** At about the same time, Breedveldt Boer was 
replaced as assistant resident of Luwu by E. A. J. Nobele, whose sympathy 
for the mission and concern for rust en orde had grown with the incidence 
in uprisings that had begun to characterize South Sulawesi after 1914, some 
of them inspired by Islamic religious leadership. The assistant resident 
began to push for the GZB to extend its mission activities into the highlands 
of the onderafdeeling of Palopo which was the Islamic stronghold in Luwu. 
By late 1915 any reluctance within the Dutch administration to cooperate with 
the mission in afdeeling Luwu had been removed: "it is wonderful that Assistant 345
34. Letter from A. A. van de Loosdrecht to A. C. Kruyt, June 8, 1914, Rantepao 
(AHK).
35. Letter from A. A. van de Loosdrecht to A. C. Kruyt, December 30, 1914, 
Rantepao (AHK).
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Resident Nobele so strongly cooperates," wrote Kruyt in reply to a letter 
from van de Loosdrecht. *•
Tor a j an headmen had gone through nearly a decade of readjustment since 
the coming of the Dutch administration. New rules of competition had been 
thrust upon them, with the Pax Neerlandica imposed upon highlands that had 
seen so much fighting during the Bugis struggle from 1870 to 1905, in shifting 
alliances with Torajan headmen, to control the coffee and slave trade from 
the highlands.36 7 38 Firearms, once so prevalent in the hands of the powerful 
chiefs, had been turned in to the Dutch or lay rusting in the limestone caves 
that concealed them. The traditional system of Ra', the ultimate determination 
of an argument by ritualized battle, had been replaced by a government court 
to handle those quarrels that could not be peacefully resolved by village 
or district heads. Duplicating the feats of great headmen such as Pong Tiku, 
Pong Maramba, or Andi Lolo, who forcefully expanded their land holdings just 
prior to the Dutch arrival, was out of the question with the regularized order 
that the Dutch had imposed on the Sa'dan highlands. Control of retainers 
had passed from such leaders' hands, except for the days of service specifically 
granted them as compensation for their chiefly duties, and whatever extra-legal 
claims they could get away with. The benefits of the coffee trade had become 
somewhat questionable now that the controleur of Makale-Rantepao prevented 
Bugis trading agents from bargaining directly with the chiefs for access to 
their coffee ; once coffee collection was organized for government taxation 
in Makale and Rantepao towns after 1910, a sizeable source of chiefly wealth 
and power slipped from the hands of the headmen.
Although many of the traditional forms of competition for power had been 
diverted into more routinized channels, the elite still did retain perhaps 
the primary means of attracting clients, the distribution of meat. Through 
the ceremonial system, the patron-client relationship that for much of the 
year might be difficult to distinguish came clearly into view. Patrons at 
the death feast, for example, distributed portions of meat that "repaid" the 
labor clients had provided during the year. Now, without the overtly coercive 
mechanisms that had been available before the Dutch administration (the most 
direct being outright attack and seizure of individuals or an entire kampung 
for slavery), the sacrificial system assumed even greater importance as a 
vehicle of cementing patron-client relationships.
The new administration and the coming of the mission brought about opportuni­
ties as well as challenges. New symbols of power were introduced: the Dutch 
awarded medals of service to chiefs who had helped to put down Torajan resistance; 
officers' dress jackets replaced the ch ief's traditional clothing; and the 
office of pangarak (caller) was created to place some distance between the 
chief and those he might wish to summon.33 Through the missionary came another
36. Letter from A. C. Kruyt to A. A. van de Loosdrecht, April 4, 1916, Pendolo 
(AHK).
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potential symbol of influence, the village school. While the chiefs did not 
clearly understand the reason for building schools and harbored some suspicion 
of them, it was widely known that the government supported their construction. 
By building a school a chief looking for increased influence put himself closer 
to the light of government patronage.
Most Torajans who knew van de Loosdrecht seem to have viewed him as an 
extension of the Dutch administration. *9 The short period during which he 
avoided attacking Torajan religious beliefs was generally cordial, however. 
Chiefs enjoyed receiving a visitor, exchanging stories with him, inquiring 
about his tondok, and making observations about the unusual aspects of To 
Belanda that they had observed. One remarked that Dutch mothers must be lax 
in teaching their children language, since the Dutch always went around asking 
Torajans what the words were for various things they saw. Another noted that 
he had never seen a mug like the one the missionary’s wife had used to serve 
him coffee, and according to custom asked to take it home with him.
As Torajan chiefs began to hear messages that contradicted their system of 
beliefs, they responded variously. Some, such as Tandiseru, a kampung head from 
Tikala, announced that he would "rather be exiled than believe in Christianity"; 
another felt it was "preferable to die than to leave the religion of the fore­
fathers."40 Others sought comments on the missionary’s stories from Islamic 
teachers they knew in the towns of Makale or Rantepao or in Luwu. They were, like 
Ne’ Mattandung of Balusu, seriously considering conversion to Islam after years 
of contact with Islamic elites; or they were, like Pong Maramba, continually 
seeking alliances that would provide the most room for maneuver: Christian 
when Islam pressed, Muslim when Christianity threatened. There were chiefs 
who saw an unabashed syncretism as the way to deal with the god of the Kompania, 
finding "a place for Pong Isa" (Jesus) among the deata, the host of spirits 
complementing Torajan d e it ie s .39 401 42 During the missionary's first year this 
suggestion to incorporate a new element into their beliefs was the warmest 
response that he received.
Much in the early teachings of the missionary sounded quite funny to Torajans 
but some of the stories contained similarities with those they had heard from 
their Muslim neighbors. The story of the crucifixion was not impressive, 
given their belief in the efficacy of trial by ordeal. In their view, if 
this god was powerful he would never have died that way. 41 Even more difficult 
to accept was the belief that each man was a sinner. The Torajan view of 
religious responsibility corresponded more to a system of rituals and duties 
that were carried out at the proper time and for the proper persons or deities. 
Thus a typical Torajan response to hearing that he was a sinner was that his 
heart was good; how could he be a sinner? The full flavor of this attitude 
was carried in a quotation that comes a year later than the period under review 
but aptly emphasizes the point: "Oh Tuan, my heart is right; I am a friend
assisting the kampung headman. All were initiated under the Dutch administration. 
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39. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, August 1917, p. 69.
40. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, October 1916, p. 97; August 1915, p. 60.
41. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, May 1915, p. 31; July 1915, p. 44.
42. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, April 1915, p. 21.
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of the Kompania . . . and my heart is right toward you, as well as toward 
Puang Tarongkon [the Puang of Makale] and is right toward the deatas to whom 
I never forget to provide offerings."4*
The Torajan fascination with death and the afterlife did, however, provide 
some common ground for discussion. Their most appreciative responses to the 
missionary came when he described the Christian vision of the hereafter. 
Pong Maramba, at a time when he was encouraging visits from both Islamic teachers 
and the missionary, once told the latter that it was as if his stories made 
the heavens open up for him, Maramba, to catch a glimpse.43 4 456 This sort of 
reinforcement naturally skewed the content of early Christian proselytizing 
among the Torajans, at least insofar as the missionary could still see some 
promise in the elite. But there were seeds of conflict in an approach that 
down-played the message of love and the sacrificial lamb while emphasizing 
the afterlife. Taking that as a point of departure, it was hard to avoid 
a basic commentary on Torajan funeral practice and conceptions of the hereafter. 
This opened the way to fundamental differences between the Christian conception 
of heaven and the Torajan conception of Puya, where the social hierarchy was 
believed to continue much as it had on earth. Once the more egalitarian aspect 
of Christianity was exposed, the fascination with "making the heavens open 
up" was replaced by a concern that the existing social order not be turned 
upside down.
While proselytizing did not force an immediate response from the headmen 
because there was little danger of anyone converting, the building of schools 
did. Generally schools received an ambivalent response from the powerful 
chiefs, with somewhat more enthusiasm coming from the less powerful in small 
districts. The school could be interpreted as another symbol of the chief's 
power, located as it was near his house in most villages that had a school. 
It could also be seen as a threat to his' control of the village, since it 
introduced through the guru, usually a non-Torajan, a foreign element beholden 
to the missionary.
In principle, most of the major tondok that were pressed to build schools 
acquiesced, with their chiefs providing manpower and access to the materials 
needed for construction. Since the chiefs' retainers were doing the building, 
it was customary for them to be provided with meals in return for their labor. 
Only in Tondon did the headman refuse outright to allow a school to be built. 
This refusal stemmed from a dispute between the guru in the Rantepao government 
school and the ruling headman of Tondon over the treatment of the latter's 
child. After the guru was relieved of his position the resistance declined, 
and a new school was built in Tondon in 1916.4 *
The posture of the chiefs was critical in the initial years of a school's 
existence. Children needed a great deal of coaxing to go to school; indeed, 
the first few times they saw the missionary approaching for school inspection 
they ran from sight, crying out the characteristic whoop formerly associated 
with warfare.44 The sight of a "belanda" was still rare enough to inspire 
tremendous apprehension; eventually van de Loosdrecht sent his teachers out
43. D. C. Prins, ADV, April 1918, p. 27.
44. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, December 1914, p. 102.
45. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, August 1917, p. 70.
46. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, October 1914, p. 87.
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alone to get the schools functioning and came himself only for their official 
dedication.
Once the children had been initiated into the school system, other problems 
arose to cause the chiefs concern. The guru regularly administered corporal 
punishment, disturbing not only the victims of the poundings but their parents as 
well. 47 48950 This was not merely a dispute over the proper locus of corporal disci­
pline, the home or school. Rather, it cut deeply against the Torajan ethic 
of how children should be raised. They believed that, if a young child were 
hit, his spirit could desert him, and the child would become seriously ill. 
Toby Volkman reports that only after a child has suffered from smallpox, the 
most feared disease, is it considered proper to administer a physical blow.44
Another cause for concern stemmed from the students’ reactions to life 
in the village once they had attended school in the town. Some refused to 
return home to live an agricultural life, or to engage in manual labor of 
any sort. In Buntao, children refused to work in the fields after schooling, 
leading van de Loosdrecht to note with some alarm that an "educated proletariat" 
was in the making. While this may have been the result of life in the town 
as much as of the education received there, the chiefs associated the tears 
in the social fabric of the village with their children’ s going away to school. 
The missionary’s reassurances that this was not the intended response from 
the children and his encouragement of education in the villages quieted some 
but not all their fears.4*
A good indication of the depth of the mistrust among the elite was the 
nearly universal practice of substituting their retainers’ children for their 
own in the schools. This, naturally, made the children’ s resistance to manual 
labor all the more chilling, for it promised an unmanageable clientele in 
the future. The elite was afraid from the outset that the government's motive 
in recruiting their children was to send them to the military and take them 
away from the highlands. *°
Another measure of mistrust was the small number of girls sent to the 
schools despite constant reminders from the authorities that schools were 
intended for both sexes. This restraint was most notable in the large, powerful 
tondok, such as Rantepao, Pangala, and Makale.
We can summarize the initial period of interaction between the missionary and 
the elite as one of caution on both sides. The missionary exercised restraint 
in his choice of religious themes, his pressing for schools, and his response 
to the ritual systems of the Torajan. The elites listened with curiosity 
and a tolerance based on their awareness that local Dutch authority solidly 
supported the mission.
Resolution: The Dutch
When van de Loosdrecht first arrived in Rantepao he had the keen eye of 
a traveler who has not yet become numbed to the new things he sees around
47. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, August 1917, pp. 69-70; April 1918, p. 27.
48. Toby Volkman, personal communication.
49. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, August 1915, p. 60.
50. J. Belksma, ADV, June 1918, p. 43.
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him. He was immediately drawn to observing the social hierarchy around him, 
and apparently felt it necessary to justify the existence of the large number 
of "slaves” (kaunan) in the Torajan social structure. It was somewhat difficult 
for him to do so because of the narrow ascriptive way he defined the kaunan 
as "slaves," or "former slaves" rather than seeing them functionally as clients.41 
Even so he found it possible to rationalize their condition in Biblical terms, 
resorting to the Pauline exhortation that masters and slaves must each know 
their own roles. 44 Indeed, his motivation was not unlike Paul's, in that 
van de Loosdrecht had gone to Rantepao with the desire to appeal to the elite 
with his religious message, not to turn the society upside down.
In comparison with his later position, his early observations appear remark­
ably dispassionate and tolerant of indigenous social behaviors and structures. 
He attempted to sketch the social "status groups" (standen) in terms of the 
rulers and the ruled (the former being the puang and tomakaka classes, the 
latter being the "slaves" [kaunan] and debt slaves [to sandang]), limiting 
his remarks merely to the contention that most to sandang fell into servitude 
through gambling, which continued clandestinely despite strong government 
prohibitions. 44 With regard to the position of women, he simply noted that 
they appeared to be socially more equal to men in the Rongkong hill country 
(northern Luwu) than they did among the Sa'dan highlanders of Rantepao.44
Within a few months, however, after the missionary had begun to encounter 
some resistance from the elite whose position he had initially sought to ration­
alize, he took a much more critical view. He began sending home to mission 
headquarters unflattering information on the Torajans, information he had 
undoubtedly noted previously: "human heads adorn the facades of houses in 
Bori" and the inhabitants there used to practice cannibalism, according to 
an old Tominaa.44 In July 1915 having come up square against the powerful 
headman of Rantepao he pessimistically assessed the chances of conversion: 
"Pong Maramba is not for it, though the missionary is on a good footing with 
him. Brother van de Loosdrecht expects a violent struggle in Rantepao."44 
Indicating that he had moved on from his view of the Torajan as "child-like" 
in many ways, he now concluded that "(t)he worldly wisdom is much greater 
than one thinks and the sins are more awesome." As van de Loosdrecht came 
to view the elite less as naive wards than as shrewd adversaries, his approach
to evangelizing became more bold. It was as though he had decided to reject
the recalcitrant old notables and to begin making an appeal to the lower orders 
of Torajan society.
Our first clear indication of this comes in the western tondok of Rano.
It was from this outlying district and from Simbuang further west that the
missionary had received his first rural expressions of interest in conversion, 
which prompted him to declare that "the signs are such that Makale may be 512346
51. For a discussion of this terminology, see Bigalke, "Dynamics of the Torajan 
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won over to Christianity before Rantepao."*7 It is unclear just why he should 
have chosen to open his offensive against the elite in a place where the elite 
itself was most interested in converting; it may have been a strategic blunder. 
But open it he did, with a Torajan-tailored version of the "rich fool” parable, 
told in terms of rice barns, water buffalo, and fat pigs owned in profusion 
by a rich man named Pare La'bi ("Excessive Rice"). The crowd that gathered 
to hear this parable expressed great sympathy and affection for the wealthy 
Pare La’bi whom van de Loosdrecht painted as a gross materialist. He labeled 
this rich man a fool because his wealth had prevented him from attending to 
what really mattered, the spiritual dimension of his life. Van de Loosdrecht 
records that the inhabitants of Rano responded with shock to the contention 
that Pare La’ bi could be out of favor with any deity, given the man's great 
wealth: "My application fell like a thunderbolt on the many gathered. Such 
a message was wholly new to them: a ’ rich’ man called a ’fool’ by God. People 
sat dismayed; with open mouths they listened further to my explanation and 
the reasons that it was foolishness in God’s eye. That God loves the poor 
as well as the rich was not something that came to the Torajan mind."** More 
significant than the message that a rich man could be a spiritual fool was 
the correlation that the missionary began to draw between the wealth of some 
and the oppression of others: "A rich man is held in a kind of holy fear by 
the Torajan. People put him on a pedestal. Let him extort villagers, swindle, 
in a word be heartless, but he remains in their eyes great and men call him 
’good’ because the blessing of the gods is upon him." Over the next eighteen 
months his class critique sharpened. He began openly to censure the basic 
inequalities in Torajan socioeconomic relationships, portraying them as having 
been exacerbated by the complicity between the Bugis and Torajan elites during 
the days of the slave trade. "The rich are loveless and hard toward the poor," 
he lamented. "Adat and people's rights have suffered a great deal . . . under 
this unchaining of passions. Some families have especially known how to profit 
from this situation and how to gain access to excessively large landholdings. *» 
The result of this greed for rice land, he said, had been to reduce most Torajans 
to tenants or laborers without control of even a small piece of wet-rice field. 
"For the greatest part of the year they possess no rice and feed themselves 
on greens that their wives collect in rice fields."
The plight of those labeled "the dispossessed" became his major focus, 
replacing his initial focus on the old guard, whom he now defined as oppressors. 
And he broadened the application of "the dispossessed" to include the impoverished 
tomakaka as well as kaunan, attributing the plight of the former not to land 
seizures but to the Torajan death cult. He correctly assessed that a landholder 
would, under economic duress, pawn his rice fields to get buffalo to meet 
his sacrificial obligations at a death feast. Often, this land would pass 
permanently from its owner's control to that of the pawnholder, who gained 
ultimate right of disposal. He argued that to halt the trend toward landlessness, 
the extent of sacrificial cutting had to be restricted: "So long as the death 
feasts are not limited, this process will continue and the gap between deep 
poverty and great riches will assume still graver forms."*0 578960
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While one might applaud the social conscience that stirred the missionary's 
soul, and acknowledge the genuine sense of revelation that came through his 
inquiries into Torajan history and social structure,one must remain aware 
that the motivations driving his inquiry did not exclude self-interest. Behind 
his revelation lay the gradually awakening realization that the ritual order 
and the socioeconomic order upheld one another: "No wonder most chiefs are 
against Christianity," he mused, stripped of his own naivete.*1 During the 
time he had conceived of his task as converting the whole of Torajan society 
through converting the elite, he had taken a Pauline view of the relationship 
of ruler to ruled, each with his duty to obey. Once he saw the inefficacy 
of this strategy for purposes of conversion, he allowed himself to entertain 
the possibility of social engineering—for which he so admired the power of 
the government—as a substitute.
Radical as was his attack on the death feast, it assumed even greater gravity 
as it came in the wake of a determined attack on gambling and cockfighting. 
Little had been done effectively to prohibit gambling in its various Torajan 
forms (including some imported by the Bugis) until the mission arrived in 
Makale-Rantepao. The government had gradually reduced the number of days 
permitted for cockfighting, which took place in the period between the death 
feast and burial, and was associated with religious conceptions of conveying 
the sumanga (life-force) of the deceased to the afterlife. Van de Loosdrecht 
sought further to reduce the number of days permitted, and restrict the practice 
solely to the elite.*2 His active opposition to cockfighting became so well 
known that headmen often teased him about it. One man assured the missionary 
with a straight face that he would happily turn Christian if the government 
would first permit him one uninterrupted year of cockfighting; on another 
occasion, when the missionary approached him at a village gathering on Sunday, 
the headman prodded: "Why not allow us to fight cock at this service?"** 
The humor, however, barely concealed the growing tension between van de Loosdrecht 
and the elite, who feared a total ban on the sporting ritual.
The GZB mission became politically very secure after the appointment of 
Brouwer as Rantepao controleur and the promotion of Controleur Nobele from 
Makale to the assistant resident position in Palopo. The new Makale controleur 
was less openly sympathetic to the GZB and to Prins, its neophyte missionary in 
Makale, but he did not pose an obstacle to the spirit of mission-government 
cooperation that had emerged with the blessing of the new assistant resident. 
Both Brouwer and Nobele were sensitive to the deterioration over the course of 
1915 of what van de Loosdrecht had termed "the more gratifying spirit that had 
prevailed in Toraja initially. . . ."** They saw this more surly spirit as a 
spillover from the series of local rebellions that had broken out in Luwu that 
year, and resolved to use a show of force to prevent any further spread of 
dissension to Makale-Rantepao. Thus when van de Loosdrecht's probings into village 
life brought to light some of the unsavory but conventional activities of headmen 
in preserving or expanding their wealth and influence, the Rantepao controleur, 
backed by the assistant resident, elected to open official investigations. 61234
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This was a reversal of the government's earlier decision, arrived at after 
some initial hesitation, that the activities of the elite prior to Dutch arrival 
were not subject to officia l prosecution; the ongoing implication for the 
elite had been that, within certain limits, things would go on as usual at 
the village level. By December 1915 the government was beginning to show 
its new policy in dealing with headmen's affairs.
In light of the official support van de Loosdrecht had begun to receive, 
he planned a show of strength by holding a Christmas feast in Rantepao which 
he hoped would be attended by the influential headmen of the district. The 
feast would blend the Torajan custom of slaughtering and feasting upon large 
numbers of livestock with the singing of school children and a Christian religious 
service. He received absolutely no response from the headmen until after 
Controleur Brouwer intervened by bringing pressure to bear on the key figure 
in the defiance, Pong Maramba. Maramba was persuaded to contribute a pig 
to the festiv ities, which brought a counteroffer from his major rival, Ne' 
Mattandung of Balusu, to contribute a buffalo. After other chiefs followed 
suit the success of the festival was assured, with some twenty-four pigs and 
a buffalo offered for slaughter and the promise that all the headmen would 
attend as well. The government's timely intervention on behalf of the missionary 
signalled a new cooperation between government and mission in an effort to 
break what they jointly perceived as stubborn resistance from the powerful 
old headmen. **
The full extent of their cooperation became clearer in the following two 
months. Pong Maramba spent several short periods in the Rantepao jail on 
various charges before he was finally hauled off to Palopo to stand trial 
for extortion. 65 6 67 While the headman of the most populous district in Rantepao 
awaited trial, van de Loosdrecht spelled out the motivation behind the charges 
in a letter to his mentor, Kruyt. He felt depressed about the response in 
Rantepao to his evangelizing, which was proving less favorable than that from 
Makale where much less effort had been expended. While local knowledge of 
Christianity had increased in Rantepao, the political situation had deteriorated:
. . . the political situation is still wretched, which all the 
old chiefs have a hand in; the worst enemy is Pong Maramba. Mr. 
Brouwer [the controleur] is beginning to clean up the situation, 
supported by the new Assistant Resident Nobele.
I think that Pong Maramba, who already sits in Palopo, will 
be the first to go; Brouwer is presently investigating his vile 
case. This fellow has stolen almost all the sawahs he has. People 
assess his worth at a tidy million. He does nothing of benefit 
with all his wealth, merely extorting from the people. It is 
too bad that this man is so impervious to the truth. He is our 
greatest adversary and maintains everyone here against us. But 
we will go steadily forward and in God's time the harvest will 
come here as it has in Posso. *1
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Maramba's reluctance to convert to Christianity was a great disappointment 
to van de Loosdrecht, one that he took personally. It was all the more galling 
since he was aware that Maramba himself had originally requested that missionaries 
come to Rantepao. ** He sensed that the powerful headman was now going out of 
his way to show more interest in Islam than in Christianity while van de Loosdrecht 
was seeking to convert him. Maramba's presence loomed over the missionary 
almost wherever he went in the onderafdeeling. Earlier in 1915 van de Loosdrecht 
had confronted his own powerlessness in the face of a dysentery epidemic in 
Bori. His previous admonitions not to provide sacrifices to the deata to 
ward off disease went unheeded when Maramba, on advice from Islamic teachers, 
instructed the headman there that each affected household should throw an 
egg and a needle into the river. On another occasion, when van de Loosdrecht 
made an unannounced visit to Maramba's house, he walked in on an Islamic teacher 
talking with the headman. <» In • subsequent conversations with the missionary, 
Maramba displayed the kind of knowledge of Christianity (apparently gained 
through his discussions with Muslims) that thoroughly dismayed van de Loosdrecht. 
Fluent in Bugis, befriended by Islamic teachers, having built a burial structure 
for his mother topped by the unmistakable dome of Islamic architecture, Maramba 
was showing ominous signs of not only rejecting Christianity but also possibly 
embracing Islam. If the great headman of Rantepao converted to Islam, his 
immeasurable influence threatened to sweep his thousands of clients with him.
The government's criminal court in Palopo found Pong Maramba guilty on 
twenty-four counts of extortion, and sentenced him to fifteen years in exile. 
Until the ship came to take Maramba to Java, van de Loosdrecht sought to convert 
him in his prison cell. The headman's refusal did not have the drama or the 
finality of the oaths taken against Christianity by some of his fellow headmen; 
he simply maintained, the mission journal records, that he was still unable 
to convert.68 970
Maramba's exile was merely the opening scene in a coordinated effort to 
undo the old guard. Similar criminal charges followed against Ne' Kulu and 
Danduru of Buntao, and Ne' Mattandung of Balusu was rumored to be next, because 
of accusations from van de Loosdrecht. The missionary also leveled charges 
of both incest and extortion against the Nanggala Parenge, while complaints 
filed by the missionary led to headmen in Sa'dan and Bori being punished for 
neglect of duty.71 72 Van de Loosdrecht insisted he would pursue this offensive, 
"so long as extortion is not totally rooted out, so long as the belief is 
not abandoned that our Government will leave Toraja before long, so long as 
the hope is not given up that the old conditions of plunder and thievery shall 
once again return, so long . . .  so long, in sum, until the Lord with his 
Holy Spirit comes to breathe (life ) into these spiritually dead and God's 
wonder is seen. . . . " 7l
Van de Loosdrecht’ s invective brought together the strands of his somewhat 
muddled conception of what was "wrong" with Torajan society. It was less
68. Letter from A. C. Kruyt to A. A. van de Loosdrecht, April 4, 1916, Pendolo; 
ADV, November 1916, p. 104.
69. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, August 1915, p. 63; December 1914, p. 101.
70. ADV, November 1916, p. 104.
71. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, January 1918, p. 4; August 1917, p. 68.
72. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, February 1918, pp. 9-10.
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an attack on wrongdoing as such than on what was holding back conversion. 
There can be little doubt that from the standpoint of a Western-legal view 
of justice, the charges leveled at selected members of the old guard were 
justified; the point is, however, that nearly any of their contemporaries 
could also have been convicted by the same criteria. By driving a wedge between 
those with the determination and power to resist the changes being introduced 
and those persons sympathetic to a new order, the missionary hoped to create 
a "movement" toward Christianity. If the government’ s presence were to become 
fixed as a given in the people's minds rather than another in a series of 
passing waves of influence to be ridden out, influential persons would be 
tempted to accommodate it. In this process, if social conditions were to 
stabilize to the point that the lower classes did not remain so dependent 
on the powerful to protect them from starvation and raids (or the current 
variant), they might be drawn to a religion offering them a new status.
R esolution: Torajan
By 1917 a complex mosaic of grievances toward mission and government existed 
in the Sa’dan highlands. If the government was seen as the agent for making 
decisions that affected people's lives in the tondok, the mission was viewed 
as the intelligence-gathering apparatus funneling reports from teachers, students, 
and the missionaries themselves to the controleur. While gathering damaging 
information through his active participation in village affairs, the missionary 
dispensed unsettling pronouncements on Torajan custom and the god of the Kompania, 
confirming with words what his actions had already told them: "the Kompania 
wills that you become Christian." The controleur, by sending troops and armed 
police to haul off to the Rantepao jail the parents of truant students, put 
steel into the missionary's request for manpower and materials to build the 
schools, and enforced his passion against gambling and cockfighting. While 
van de Loosdrecht might say "that the mission asks and urges but the government 
orders and punishes," the Torajan was more likely to conclude that "the mission 
asks and urges, then the government orders and punishes."7* The distinction 
was indeed too fine to have meaning in the Torajan context of 1917.
The combined weight of mission and government cooperation put a new strain 
on the indigenous religion. The missionaries told villagers to test the falsehood 
of the pemali (taboo) against such things as eating rice during the time between 
a family member's death and burial, and asserted that the souls of sacrificed 
animals did not go with the deceased to the afterworld—a belief that underpinned 
so much of Torajan religion and social behavior. The fears that the Dutch were 
out to obliterate the indigenous religion reached their height when the governor 
journeyed to Rantepao on March 2, 1917 to meet with the missionaries in what 
Torajans widely held to be a plot to convert all Torajans to Christianity.73 4
73. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, August 1917, p. 69.
74. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the governor's visit is based 
on the reports of two government investigations: W. Fryling, confidential 
report from the investigation into the death of A. A. van de Loosdrecht, Verbaal 
27-5- 1918-97, mailrapport 1836/17 (Colonial Archive, The Hague), E. A. J. Nobele, 
secret government report over the death of A. A. van de Loosdrecht), Palopo, 
August 20, 1917 (AHK).
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The rumor had some basis in truth. Indeed, the governor was meeting with 
the controleurs from Makale and Rantepao and the mission personnel (including 
Prins and van de Loosdrecht) to discuss van de Loosdrecht's proposal to abolish 
not only cockfighting but the death feast itself and ban markets on Sundays, 
essentially transforming the market system from a six-day cycle to a seven-day 
cycle, with the Sabbath off. The meeting ended with the governor supporting 
a reduction in the number of days allowed for cockfighting during a funeral 
ceremony and vigorous enforcement of the prohibition against gambling, which 
had been regularly ignored by headmen. He apparently rejected the idea of 
banning the Sunday market, but conceded that no corvde be performed by Christians 
on Sunday. His position on the death feast is not mentioned, but we may assume 
that he probably agreed with van der Veen that abolition would be premature, 
though heavy cutting at death feasts should be discouraged.
The incomplete information leaking from this meeting made a profound impression 
on Torajan headmen. Many of them met at the Rantepao headmen's hall and made 
strong statements of protest against the anticipated forced Christianization. 
The rumor soon spread that the death feast, cockfighting, and the Sunday market 
would all be abolished. Indeed, the signs had been around them for some time. 
It had become so difficult to gain a permit for cockfighting at a funeral 
ceremony that only one in ten applications was favorably received. If the
controleur thought that a cockfight had been held too recently, he would deny 
permission even to the most prominent of applicants, on the grounds that otherwise 
people would make the rounds from cockfight to cockfight, squandering their 
money.
The immediate fears stimulated by the governor's presence in Rantepao 
exacerbated long-standing animosities generated by the village schools. These 
schools, in the minds of most villagers, were a kind of corvde. New construction 
required too much hauling of wood from distant sources, especially in the
heavily populated Sa'dan heartland, and too often the wood gathered was rejected 
as unsuitable; this angered both the laborers, who had hauled it, and the
headmen, who were punished for not having seen to it that the work was properly 
completed. People in two districts felt badly aggrieved because they had
had to supply deliveries of wood for a total of three schools, four houses 
for teachers and missionaries, as well as numerous stalls for two new markets. 
This was in addition to the regular corvde labor they had to provide on local 
roads and the main road to Palopo. Having little sense of the school's utility 
to the village, people focused on their own losses, in terms of children's 
labor in the fields or at home, and the cost of clothing them for school. 
They resented being jailed or fined when their children were absent from school, 
and many objected to the taxing of death feasts to support the school through 
the "fonds sekolah," even though this supposedly voluntary contribution of 
10 percent had actually been proposed by Pong Mangassa of Tondon. In sum, 
while most headmen and their people may not initially have objected to the 
idea of having a school in their village, once it was built they found it 
objectionable and gave it little support.
In the final analysis, the perceived attack on indigenous religion and 
custom, combined with the villagers' objections to the schools, might not 
have produced the eventual violent reaction they did had not the mission and 
government made such a determined effort to undercut some of the stalwarts 
of the old elite. By selectively removing and sending into exile the linchpins 
of the elite, the Dutch may have failed to recognize the general sense of 
alarm this caused among the headmen. If it could happen to Pong Maramba, 
Ne' Lapu, and Danduru, why not to Ne' Mattandung or anyone viewed as opposing
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the mission? As Kruyt concluded, ". . . it never would have come to a death 
if something else had not been added, namely van de Loosdrecht's cooperation 
to bring to light the crooked ways of the chiefs."7* Combined with his airing 
of such matters as land seizures and elite participation in slave trading, 
and his shift in sympathy toward the "dispossessed," the missionary's thrust 
against the stalwarts raised their fears to the breaking point.
Opposition began to mount against the increased interference of mission 
and government in village affairs. In keeping with the still fissiparous 
nature of Torajan political organization, the response was largely spontaneous, 
and it cannot be said to have characterized the highlands as a whole. To 
the extent that there was a perceivable pattern, the opposition came mainly 
from the more populous, politically influential tondok of the Sa’dan valley 
in onderafdeeling Rantepao. In contrast, far greater tolerance, to some extent 
even support, for the mission's penetration came from the peripheral tondok 
that had been forced to accommodate to their more powerful neighbors prior 
to 1905, and which continued to play a subordinate role in the onderafdeeling 
administration constructed by the new overlords. The picture in onderafdeeling 
Makale shows similarities to that of Rantepao, particularly in the rapport 
that had begun to develop between the mission and the tondok peripheral to 
the Tallu Lembangna (the three populous tondok Makale, Sangalla, and Mengkendek). 
Perhaps because the mission did not become very active in Makale until 1916, 
opposition did not grow as fast as in Rantepao; it appears to have peaked 
there about three years later, with the mysterious burning of missionary Prins* 
house. 7‘
A few specific instances drawn from 1916 and 1917 serve to illustrate 
the rising resistance in Rantepao. Van de Loosdrecht had long identified 
Pangala and Balusu as key districts in which to gain support. His initial 
optimism there totally faded as Tandibua and Ne' Mattandung gave no backing 
to the schools in their districts. Pangala, it seemed to him, was the bastion 
of heathenism, meaning that adherence to the indigenous religion had remained 
firm there, with little evidence of movement among the elite toward either 
Islam or Christianity.75 67 78 The animosities generated on both sides began to 
take on personal overtones as these two district heads confronted the missionary. 
Tandibua was suddenly relieved of his position as district head on the usual 
extortion charges, which doomed the Pangala school as long as he resided in 
the district. Surreptitiously the sacked headman began to assemble supporters 
and arms in an old fort west of Pangala. Mattandung, pressed by rumors that 
he would be arrested, also began to rally his supporters, while the missionary 
dredged up unsavory charges based on the headman’ s allegedly bloodthirsty 
past as a warrior. Mattandung adopted a young tomakaka in the traditional 
"anak angkat" manner, a practice particularly prevalent in periods of unrest. 
His adopted son, Pong Massangka of Pangli, was widely known as a daring youth, 
skilled in cockfighting, who swore he would sooner fight the Kompania than 
go to jail for gambling.7*
75. Letter from A. C. Kruyt to D. Crommelin, September 1918, Pendolo (AHK).
76. J. Belksma, ADV, April 1921, pp. 26-27.
77. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, January 1918, p. 3.
78. W. Fryling, "Korte verslag over de maand, Juli 1917," Verbaal 8-4-1918-7, 
mailrapport 2135/17 (Colonial Archive, The Hague).
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In Sa'dan, opposition centered on the missionary's instructions that a better 
house had to be built for the guru. The present accommodations were wretched 
from the mission's point of view, but the unpopularity of the guru and general 
dislike of the school caused the villagers to refuse to supply labor or materials 
for anything better. Even when several headmen were prosecuted for "neglect 
of duty" their resistance did not weaken, which was particularly notable since 
the Sa'dan district head was not known for his ability or influence.79
In Nanggala the headmen directed a barrage of accusations against the guru, 
and student attendance at the school slowed to a trickle. Because of their 
determination, the headmen finally forced the guru out of the village and the 
school closed down.90 In tondok Bori (Tikala district) the opposition took a 
different course, and was directed at halting construction of the school and the 
guru's house before either could be completed. Initially the elite engineered 
a slowdown, which brought angry complaints from the mission. Ultimately their 
resistance took a more determined form, when the headmen denied food to any 
of their retainers who worked on the buildings. Starving out the kaunan in 
this manner brought construction to a standstill, until the controleur sent 
armed police into Bori to put down what he chose to interpret as a breach 
of the corvde obligation there.91 To break the boycott the government appointed 
a member of the elite to supervise each day of construction activity, making 
him responsible for seeing that the kaunan were properly fed. There is no 
indication whether or not the controleur's threat to jail any headman continuing 
to resist was tested. **
Tondon, the first district to deny labor and materials for use in school 
construction, remained a source of bitter complaints, ostensibly over a misunder­
standing between the chief and a guru from the government school in Rantepao. 
It later became apparent that the conflict ran deeper and van de Loosdrecht, 
encountering continued subdued hostility among the elite there, remarked that 
"a spirit of quiet rebellion rules in Tondon."**
Behind the scenes of isolated resistance, the headmen had begun to take 
positions that envisioned the expulsion of the Dutch. From the beginning, some 
of them had seen the Dutch as passing overlords destined not to control the 
highlands for long. As early as 1909, some of the headmen hatched a plot 
first to attack the Dutch in Makale and Rantepao, then to move on to conquer 
Palopo and Makassar.*4 Now in 1917 a variety of plots and subplots swept 
through the more rebellious tondok while in most other, less volatile, villages, 
the headmen usually chose to keep silent about them. A Tikala village headman 
did report one arms cache in March 1916, shortly after the exiling of Pong
79. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, January 1918, p. 4.
80. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, August 1917, p. 68.
81. At the time of this incident, and for several years afterwards, there was 
still no firm decision from the residential authorities as to whether or not 
school construction could be considered an obligatory duty. Van de Loosdrecht 
sought a policy statement from the governor in support of such a position, 
but appears not to have succeeded. Disappointed, he concluded that school 
construction was dependent on the good will of the local official.
82. J. Belksma, ADV, June 1918, pp. 42-43.
83. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, January 1918, p. 4.
84. W. Fryling, confidential report, p. 16.
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Maramba; it amounted to three Beaumont rifles, nearly a dozen barrels and 
bolt assemblies, and a ten-kilo keg of powder.** On July 21, 1917 the Tikala 
district head, Arung Langi, and the Bori headman, Pong Arung, reported to 
the Rantepao prosecutor that Ne’ Mattandung's adopted son had organized a 
gambling party in his kampung; they broadly hinted that "the named persons 
harbored plans to revolt." *« There was no love lost between these two informers 
and Ne* Mattandung, their animosity originating in the days of Tikala raids 
into Balusu for slaves and ransom. However, Dutch authorities proved unable 
to find Mattandung's adopted son.
Vague plans for rebellion had been in the wind since 1916, but they assumed 
a sense of urgency only after the incendiary rumors emanating from the governor's 
visit to Rantepao swept through the onderafdeeling. Accounts of who was involved 
vary, but by one Torajan version the conspirators included Tandibua of Pangala, 
Ne' Mattandung of Balusu, and Mattandung's adopted son Pong Massangka.*’  
The official Dutch investigation also implicated Pong Arung of Bori, who had 
tried to play both sides. The rebels planned simultaneous attacks on all 
Dutch compounds in Makale and Rantepao towns, and on the houses of the four 
missionaries, to drive all the Dutch from the highlands. Arms were collected 
and stored in preparation for the rebellion, though they apparently consisted 
mainly of traditional spears and long knives. Given the lack of political 
unity at the time, the plan, and the preparations for implementing it, seem 
quite impressive. Before the principal plan had a chance to develop fully, 
however, the subplot initiated by Ne' Mattandung and his followers prematurely 
came to a climax.
About July 15, 1917 Pong Massangka led a dozen followers into Rantepao 
on market day to wait in ambush for Controleur Brouwer, who typically took 
a walk around the market each day in the late afternoon. Hiding knives in 
their sarung, the band watched the controleur, with his wife and young son, 
approach to within two hundred meters (by Brouwer's later reckoning) of where 
they were hiding behind some trees. Suddenly the child stumbled and fell, 
beginning to wail. Rather than take the protesting child through the crowded 
market, Brouwer and his wife decided to return home at once, thwarting the 
plot of the would-be assassins.**
When Massangka and his supporters returned to Pangli, Ne' Mattandung held a 
gambling party for them. They then made a second plan for an assassination, 
this time of van de Loosdrecht at his house in Barana, just north of Rantepao. On
85. W. Fryling, "Kort verslag over de maand Maart 1916," mailrapport 1301/16 
(Indonesian National Archive, Bogor Repository).
86. W. Fryling, confidential report, pp. 5-6.
87. S. J. Sarungu, "Sejarah Peperangan Pong Tiku dengan Belanda tahun 1906-1907" 
(Rantepao, 1971), pp. 48-49.
88. M. R. Brouwer, Letter to A. C. Kruyt, February 18, 1918, Rantepao (AHK). 
Torajan accounts of this story coincide with the account Brouwer gained from 
interrogating Pong Massangka about the incident; in current Torajan accounts, 
such as Tandilintin’ s popularized history, the young boy’s wailing is given 
as the reason the controleur returned home, while the fact that his wife was 
pregnant is given as the reason the Torajan plotters did not then fall upon 
them (it is taboo). I initially suspected the veracity of this account, but 
Brouwer's letter confirms that his wife was then in about her fifth or sixth 
month of pregnancy.
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the evening of the 26th the group, joined by others who had not participated in 
the earlier attempt, slaughtered a pig and prepared rice for a ceremonial meal 
before starting off for the missionary's house. A courier had just returned 
with word from Ne' Mattandung that he agreed with their plan to attack the 
missionary. According to one account, lances were stuck into the ground as 
the conspirators swore an oath of war. Suddenly someone appeared with the 
news that van de Loosdrecht had been seen at a guru’s house in Bori, some 
twenty minutes away. Under cover of darkness, thirteen of the celebrants 
then hurried off to carry out their plan.
After the band reached the Bori bridge, the designated assassin left them 
and approached the porch where the missionary was reading to the guru. Leaping 
onto the porch, the young warrior plunged his lance through van de Loosdrecht's 
lower chest; as he slumped to the floor, the dying missionary knocked over 
the lamp, and flames engulfed the porch as the band slipped away.
Passions pent up over the period of several rice harvests poured out that 
night and the next. With the active or passive support of many villagers 
Pong Massangka and his followers swept through Tokarau market an hour away, 
burning the newly constructed market stalls. They then returned to Pangli 
where they burned three bridges linking the village with the road to Rantepao—a 
road resented by Massangka because, without consulting him, the government 
had confiscated a portion of his rice fields for a right-of-way. •» The inhabitants 
of Pangli were whipped into an anti-Dutch frenzy, and they built barricades 
around village entrances, preparing to fight the Dutch troops that they knew 
would soon arrive. Reports to the assistant resident indicate that the Dutch 
expected a fierce battle in Pangli.
Controleur Brouwer, with his half-brigade of armed police, proceeded from 
Bori to Balusu, bypassing the stronghold at Pangli. Two brigades of infantry 
from Palopo and two from Enrekang were already on their way to deal with any 
heavy resistance. Brouwer went to Balusu, because he suspected that Ne* Mattandung 
was somehow involved in the murder of the missionary, a suspicion that was 
confirmed when the old headman not only refused to meet him but also sent 
"a ridiculous, skinny pig and a pair of old sick chickens" as full measure 
of his esteem for the ranking Dutch official in Rantapao. »• At dusk all the 
surrounding kampung lit fires in support of Mattandung's truculence, and by 
the next morning five hundred armed supporters hovered in the hills surrounding 
the unwelcome authorities. Half a day of cat and mouse left one Torajan dead, 
shot as he advanced on the messenger bearing a summons to Ne' Mattandung. 
The stalemate ended with the arrival of the assistant resident with his troops 
from Palopo and another half-brigade of police from Makale. In the face of 
this triangular advance, Mattandung's warriors dispersed throughout the hilly 
terrain, fighting ineffectually with lances and long knives against the Dutch 
firearms. Several more Torajans were killed and captured and the resistance 
crumbled. The round-up of rebels and active sympathizers continued for two 
weeks, with hundreds being detained.
Mattandung's capture and the surrender of Pangli without a fight exposed 
the weakness of the leadership behind the plots to kill Brouwer and van de 
Loosdrecht. The more comprehensive plans for rebellion, however, were implicating 
Tandibua of Pangala, Pong Arung of Bori, and numerous other headmen. By mid-
89. Ne’ Banding, interview, March 11, 1978, Bori (Toraja).
90. J. Belksma, ADV, December 1917, p. 103.
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August, interrogations had produced arrests of the conspirators involved in 
the more ambitious plot, and ultimately Pong Massangka surrendered, together 
with his co-conspirators in the missionary's killing. The various plots to 
expel the Dutch from the highlands had misfired, and fifty-six persons from 
onderafdeeling Rantepao were exiled. With the departure of Tandibua and his 
lieutenants, Ne* Mattandung and his, Pong Massangka and the tragic Pong Arung 
(who committed suicide in jail), the steel went out of the Torajan resistance 
to change—particularly the change dictated by the mission and a sympathetic 
government. Pong Maramba and Danduru had preceded them, Tangki Langi', an 
influential headman in Pangala convicted in a sawah dispute, followed. The 
missionary who succeeded van de Loosdrecht recorded the whispers passing through 
Bori, the tondok which lost the most prominent tomakaka, as news of their 
deaths in exile trickled into Rantepao: "the Dutch are killing all our great 
men." »l
Conclusion
Why this outbreak of rebellion in July 1917? It arose after several years 
of grievances that grew out of a tightening of colonial administration throughout 
South Sulawesi. Reports of refusals to pay taxes and evasion of corvee labor 
assignments had been increasing since about 1915, around the time when the 
Dutch administrative machinery was coming to be set firmly in place.** The 
demands for construction of new roads, school and administrative buildings, 
and assessment of the head tax were by then becoming unavoidable, as they 
were enforced by local armed police reinforced, if necessary, from the afdeeling 
capital. Headmen were no longer the masters of their own realms; many of 
the decisions they were compelled to support emanated from the onderafdeeling 
capital and beyond. What at first may have seemed little more onerous than 
the exaggerated tributary claims of Luwu looked very different to the headmen 
as their own powers came to be circumscribed by a new and more penetrating 
form of external political control.**
In Makale-Rantepao, the coming of the mission amplified the effects of 
this penetration. In addition to the taxes and corvee labor with which people 
throughout South Sulawesi had to contend there was now the difficult-to-ignore 
presence of village schools. Villagers often resented providing labor and 
materials for purposes that they barely understood; while officially the headman 
had to give his consent before school construction could begin, this condition 
was easily overlooked. Even more important, it was by no means certain that the 
consent of the "village" head, a creation of the Dutch administration, reflected 
the feelings of those heading indigenous formal or informal power structures. 
Most headmen who broke with the administration in 1917 had previously singled 
out some aspect of the school for criticism.
91. J. Belksma, ADV, February 1921, p. 11.
92. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, May 1916, p. 40.
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The school was simply the most visible target for protest. It reminded 
sensitive headmen of the broader encroachments on their lives that had occurred 
over the decade of Dutch control. Had these feelings been handled with more 
sensitivity, more guarantees that their world would not be turned upside down, 
the rebellion in 1917 probably would not have occurred. Instead, the period 
1913-1917 was one of increasingly close cooperation between government and 
mission to bring about fundamental change in the highlands, with less public 
assurance that tradition (adat) would be protected here than was generally 
the case in areas of Dutch rule. Van de Loosdrecht found an ally in the controleur 
of Rantepao, who was one of a small minority of Netherlands East Indies civil 
servants who shared the missionary's Gereformeerde (Calvinist) Christianity 
rather than the more relaxed, liberal Reformed Christianity against which 
the Dutch Calvinists had rebelled in the late nineteenth century. »4 This 
alliance moved the controleur much further along toward providing official 
support to the GZB than would otherwise have been possible, contributing to 
the strong impression that the government and mission were working together 
to convert Torajans to Christianity. They were, in fact, doing so, with support 
from the highest levels in the Netherlands Indies administration, but the 
process was to be a much more subtle and long-range project than the rebelling 
Torajan headmen could have realized. What probably precipitated the rebellion 
in mid-1917 was the governor's visit to Rantepao, which touched off rumors, 
not totally unfounded, that the Dutch meant to abolish the death feast and 
gambling, and Christianize all Torajans. A growing sense that few options 
but open resistance remained was undoubtedly strengthened by Pong Maramba's 
exile and the investigations being conducted against other headmen who had 
openly opposed van de Loosdrecht.
Indeed, it is striking that the most dramatic resistance to Dutch rule 
since Pong Tiku's lengthy resistance to the occupation in 1906 »* should have 
been so devoid of ideological content. One could try to attribute this to
the nature of the Dutch inquiry into the rebellion, inclined as most such 
investigations were to classify peasant rebellions into a few easily dismissable 
categories, such as "Ratu Adil" (millenarian) in Java and "religious fanaticism" 
in such strongly Islamic areas as lowland South Sulawesi. Yet even indigenous 
oral sources bear out the Dutch conclusions. It may be that colonial penetration 
was not sufficiently advanced to have given rise to religious revivalism. 
Those resisting the advance still stood firmly enough on an indigenous religious 
foundation that was almost unconsciously a part of their lives. The entire 
episode rather seems to have been initiated by an elite that felt it was losing 
control and was being goaded by a missionary attempting to bypass the elite 
in order to convert the masses, and thereby attacking the very basis of the 
social hierarchy.
The number involved in the 1917 rebellion was not large, but its leadership 
was prominent. This promised possible further disruptions unless the tensions 
that had precipitated the outburst could be reduced. The government was aware 
of the fragility of a bureaucracy staffed and supported by so few Dutchmen; 
"peace and security" depended on the support of the traditional elite. Thus 
the Torajan rebellion could not be lightly dismissed.
94. Van de Loosdrecht, ADV, February 1914, p. 14.
95. On this resistance, see Terance W. Bigalke, "A Social History of 'Tana 
Toraja' 1870-1965" (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1981), pp. 
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The controleur, with full compliance from the mission, issued orders that 
Torajans could no longer be summoned from their field labor for impromptu 
meetings with missionaries nor could they be coerced to attend mission functions. 
Any request for a village school must come directly from the kampung head, 
supported by a majority of his villagers, and only voluntary labor could be 
used to construct future schools and teachers' houses, except when there were 
extreme shortages of manpower.®* Soldiers and armed police, who were stationed 
in the towns, could no longer be dispatched to round up truant village children 
and drag their parents off to jail, nor could the latter be fined for their 
children's truancy.®7 All these restrictions probably helped to relieve some 
of the major irritants to high status persons, from whose ranks the mission 
recruited most of its students at this time, and to reduce the disruptive 
effects of the school on village society.
These changes in government policy clarified the hierarchy of Dutch authority 
in Makale-Rantepao, differentiating the compulsory power of the administration 
from the (in theory) merely persuasive authority of the mission. For the 
village elite, this meant more freedom to reject out-of-hand the advances 
of the missionaries and teachers. Yet the changes still left the rivals to 
the ruling elite with an alternative path to power through the mission, and 
middle and lower status villagers were not foreclosed from rejecting the prevailing 
social hierarchy and finding a new source of patronage. This had important 
consequences for subsequent Torajan history.
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in Om te Gedenken (Delfts van Barneveld, 1938), p. 158. This missionary mentions 
that after 1917 children could be heard to say, "Tae' namadin diparuku" ("he 
can’ t force us"), indicating that they realized coercion could no longer be 
used to make them attend school.
